In writing about the culture of violence that is both the necessary foundation and natural concomitant of, the military occupation of the West Bank, Amira Hass writes something bad and stupid:
“Throwing stones is the birthright and duty of anyone subject to foreign rule.”
It’s odd, too, because elsewhere in her essay she writes compellingly about civil disobedience, suggesting that training in the theory and practice of thoughtful, peaceful resistance should be part of the curriculum of Palestinian schools. Violence, though, is not civil disobedience, and her words are not only morally corrupt, but strategically dangerous, threatening to further damage what there is of political discourse and to accelerate a looming spiral into chaos and bloodshed.
So: her statement is bad and stupid.
It is important, though, to note what her statement is not. It is not, contrary to the claims of some, an incitement to murder. Throwing rocks at people is violent, is dangerous, and may be lethal, but it is generally not an attempt at homicide, and everyone knows this – including those making the most extreme claims against Hass. Should the settlers who threw stones at Palestinian school buses, or at police and soldiers who have come to dismantle illegal structures, have been treated as would-be murderers?
Yes, a stone can kill. So can a rubber-jacketed bullet; so can a baton. But when police use them in riot control they are hailed – or criticized – for using non-lethal force, in spite of the potential danger. And that is because we recognize the distinction between an act of violence with the intent to kill, and an act of violence with a different intent; between throwing a stone and throwing a grenade.
Moral judgment means precisely that – judgment. It means evaluation, it means judgment. To say that something is bad does not mean that it is the worst; to say that something is not the worst is not to say that it is ok. What do incitements to, or justification of, murder look like? “Deathto Arabs” spray-painted on a wall – that looks like one. Suggesting that “din rodef” applies to an individual or group, that could look like one, too. “Throwing stones is the birthright and duty of anyone subject to foreign rule?” Not so much.
Should we condemn Amira Hass’s justification of violence as morally corrupt? Yes. But we should condemn it for what it is – not for what it isn’t.